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ABSTRACT 
 
The oil economy of Nigeria is very important to the country, but the people of Nigeria still suffer 
from a corrupt government.  Despite the revenues being brought in from oil exports, the Nigerian 
government still holds a large unemployment rate and a high poverty rate.  This paper shows the 
amount of oil being produced per day, as well as, the process by which the oil is brought to the 
market.  This paper also shows the labor to GDP ratio, the major exports, and the major imports of 
Nigeria.  Finally, an understanding of the ethnic struggle within Nigeria is looked at, as well as, the 
illegal oil racketeering that is costing the Nigerian governments billions of dollars.  Until the people 
of Nigeria can take control of its government and rid themselves of the crushing militias that 
controls the politics in Nigeria, the people are doomed to suffer. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the discovery of Nigerian oil in 1956 and its rise to the tenth largest oil-producing nation in the world, 
Nigeria has remained a country of political unrest, social disorder and economic instability whose national 
ills continue to be linked to its greatest but most corruptive factor, „the dark nectar‟ of Africa.  Since its 
transition to civilian rule, political attempts to stabilize friction among Nigerians and multinational oil companies have 
been made to ensure production and cut export losses.  However, fighting between rival ethnic groups continues to 
slow production and provides an unreliable producer that has been offset by the recent discovery of offshore oil 
deposits, which is expected to increase GDP.   
 
As a major oil-producing nation, the fluctuation of Nigeria oil production, prices and inflation can cause 
problems for regions such as the United States, Western Europe, and Asia, who have taken refuge in Nigerian oil due 
to the current tension in the Middle East.  With such large potential for success, Nigeria remains one of the poorest 
countries in the world with much of its profits going to the multinational oil companies that populate the country 
including Royal/Dutch Shell, ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobile, TotalfiaElf, Agip and PanOcean Oil with the NNPC 
receiving only 57% of profits.  While multinational contractors receive almost half of Nigerian oil profits, local 
Nigerian contractors receive far less due to their relatively low employment in the oil industry.  Not only are local 
contractors omitted from the large sums received by the multinational oil companies, but also most of Nigeria‟s 
populations are unemployed with a very small percentage benefiting from its native breadwinner.   
 
With the cultivation of massive amounts of money and oil, Nigeria has also reaped havoc upon its 
environment risking local communities, crops and ecosystems, most of which are given little thought when oil 
deposits are present.  Nigeria‟s plethora of oil can bring it to great heights, expanding its wealth to an impoverished 
country bringing education, health, political and social order to its people.  However, until improvements are made 
within the newly established government, and relations between the Nigerian people and inhabitant oil companies are 
properly instituted, Nigeria will continue to cultivate a restless and poorly maintained country.  The objective of this 
paper is to show the impact of oil to the Nigeria economy. 
 
S 
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THE IMPACT OF OIL PRODUCTION ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
 
As the 10
th
 largest oil producer in the world and the third largest in Africa, Nigeria has an economy that is 
very dependent upon its oil sector.  It accounts for 95% of Nigeria‟s foreign exchange earnings, and they have oil 
reserves estimated between 24 billion and 31.5 billion.  They produce 90 million tons per year.  And with an economy 
based so explicitly around one product, it is almost impossible for it not to affect everything about Nigeria‟s structure 
and culture.  The civil unrest that has plagued the country since the end of the 18
th
 century was only fueled by demand 
for control of this new market.  In the late 1950‟s, Nigeria began to drill for oil and in 1970 during the oil boom, 
unrest escalated to an all out civil war.  Because of corruption and misuse of power, the oil market has produced very 
little social and structural development in Nigeria.  The general Nigerian population fails to see the investment of the 
oil revenue back into their lives.  Nearly 95% of oil produced in Nigeria is produced through the joint venture there, 
Shell being the largest and producing nearly 50%.  Nigeria sees about 60% of what they produced.  Nigerian GDP 
fluctuates with the booms of oil and overspending of the government and is not always in hand with the amount of oil 
being produced.  Employment and literacy rates have risen slowly with the coming of the oil market but energy output 
has been severely damaged by drilling and oil spills. 
  
Nigeria covers an area of 923,768 sq km (356,669 sq mi) and is by far the most populated of Africa‟s 
countries.  Nigeria has a tropical climate and about two-thirds of Nigeria lies in the watershed of the Niger River, 
which empties into the Atlantic at the Niger Delta.  Petroleum and natural gas, the source of most of Nigeria‟s export 
earnings, are concentrated in large amounts in the Niger Delta and just offshore.  Smaller deposits are scattered 
elsewhere in the coastal region. 
 
There are two main oil markets in Nigeria:  an upstream and a downstream.  The upstream oil industry, based 
in the fertile Niger River Delta, is the most important economic sector in Nigeria‟s economy producing over 90% of 
its total exports.  Oil in the upstream market is produced from 5 of Nigeria‟s 7 sedimentary basins: the Niger Delta, 
Anambra, Benue Trough, Chad, and Benin.  About 80% of oil-producing wells are drilled in the upstream sector.   
 
The major foreign stakeholder in this region is Shell.  But as Nigeria‟s economic backbone, the upstream 
sector also proves central to the ongoing civil unrest in the country.  Nigeria‟s downstream economy has four 
refineries with a capacity of 445,000 bbl/day.  But they often only operate at 40% of full capacity because of fire, 
corruption, poor management and incapacitation.  Cross-border smuggling is an ongoing problem and there are 
frequent reports of large scale corruption in the distribution and marketing chain.  The government through the NNPC 
has had an all encompassing control over the industry through its shareholding in all the companies involved and in 
the setting of wholesale and retail prices.   This has produced shortages of refined product that Nigeria needs to meet 
domestic demands and their own quotas (1.89 million bbl/d).  Deregulation of the downstream oil area is a stated aim 
of the government, but this is likely to depend on the still heavily sponsored prices allowed to rise to international 
levels. 
 
Until 1960, Britain controlled Nigeria and their natural resource mines and government participation in the 
oil industry was limited to the regulation and administration of fiscal policies.  In 1960, Nigeria declared 
independence, but the Nigerian government was not ready for independence.  In 1966, the cultural and social tensions 
between the north and the south erupted into a series of massacres, and a military coup that installed the first series of 
military governments.  This was followed by a three year civil war that left 1,000,000 dead.  After the civil war 
Nigeria joined OPEC.  In line with their resolutions, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation was established which in 
1977 became the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.  It continues to dominate all areas of the oil industry, both 
up and downstream.  Nigeria entered a period of prosperity and quickly rising oil pushed the Nigerian government 
into a reckless spending spree.  Corruption became rampant and when the world recession and oil bust of the 1980‟s 
hit, inflation soared; there was large scale unemployment, massive debt and widespread corruption.   
 
In 1993 a new leader, General Abacha, became the leader.  He ruled as a despot and failed to bring about the 
democracy he promised.  He was censured by human rights group for his execution of the play-write Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and civil unrest again broke out, hindering oil production and still keeping the general population from seeing any sort 
of return from it.  When Abacha died in 1998, he was replaced by General Abubakar who promised a return to civilian 
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rule.  He kept his promise and in 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader and political prisoner until 1998, 
was elected president.  In April of 2000, the Nigerian government set up a new committee on oil and gas reform to 
deal with the deregulation and privatization of NNPC. 
 
Many Nigerians regard oil as a gift from God believe it is their right to enjoy it at cheap prices, a belief which 
begins to sum up the risks of investing in Nigeria.  The civil unrest from the oil market in Nigeria is based around the 
inequitable sharing of the countries oil revenues among its population.  The Nigerians feel as though they are not 
benefiting from their natural resources, creating the civil unrest that often makes it dangerous or risky to invest in 
Nigeria; 700 deaths and shut off terminals and flow stations are just some of the results.  Corruption within the 
industry and the government creates a very tough situation when the people lack equitable sharing and the revenue 
from the oil market is not being pumped back into the economy or the right places in the society.   
 
The government has failed to stop this in the past too, and environmental responsibilities of the oil companies 
are not often addressed.  Nigerians border disputes also exacerbate this risky situation.  While the Nigerians feel it is 
their land and their oil, Cameroon and Guinea feel that it is theirs.  Negotiations between the two countries have met 
little if any success.  Apart from those social concerns there is also an inability for the NNPC to meet funding 
obligations to the JVs.  The government is seeking to diversify funding for the industry and alternative funding 
schemes. 
 
 
  
  
The GDP in millions of U.S. dollars is illustrated over a 30 year period by the purple line on the above graph.  
In 1970, Nigeria had just become a member of OPEC and their annual GDP began being recorded.  As they entered 
OPEC, they began a harnessing of their natural resources prevalence.  Their GDP was on a very, steady and fast rise 
throughout the 1970s at an average of almost $5 billion per year.  But after a peak in 1981, the global recession hit and 
their period of prosperity caused by their oil boom began a decline.  Illustrated in the graph, the decline begins slowly 
at first but in 1987 drops sharply and stays very low for a period of 8 years.   
 
Their oil economy rose sharply again in 1996, peaking due to exploration and success with new areas of high 
risk drilling in deep and ultra deep areas.  Their prosperity lasted only a few years and fell again in 1999 with the 
election of their new president.  With the change from a military government to a civilian run government, the oil 
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multinationals were hesitant about their investments because of the extreme risk in the new base of the government, 
but it began a rise again in 2000, growing at a very similar rate to that of the rise in 1970.  If the government wishes to 
contain a steady rise or hold a high constant GDP it will be necessary for them to anticipate recessions and rule out 
reckless spending in times of prosperity. 
 
THE MODEL CONSIDERATION 
 
The rural sector‟s population is N1 and A is the total energy land area which is owned within the rural sector.  
Intrasectoral distribution is ignored, and a = A/N
1
 is the land area per worker.  The term L
1
 denotes the hours worked 
by each worker.  The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, and X   X (A/N 1 , L 1 1)   X (a, L 1 ) is 
the output per worker.  A rural worker‟s consumption of the rural and the urban good is denoted by (x
1
, y
1
).  The 
surplus of the rural good per worker, Q, is given by 
 
(1) Q = X - x
1
.  
 
The relative price of the rural good in terms of the urban good is denoted by p. A rural worker‟s budget constraint 
becomes  
 
(2) pQ = y
1
.       
 
A rural worker‟s utility is represented by U
1
 = U(x
1
, y
1
, L
1
).  The indirect utility is obtained from 
 
(3) V
1
 ( p, N
1
) =   
111 ,,
max
Lyx
(x
1
, y
1
, L
1
) + 
1  [ pX (A / N 1 , L 1 ) – px 1  – y 1 ] 
 
From the envelop theorem 
 
(4)  V 1 /  p = 1 Q > 0 
 
and  V 1 / 0/ 111  NapXN a  
 
where X ,/ aXa  and 
i is the (positive) marginal utility of income in sector i.  It is evident that the rural surplus 
is a function of the relative price and the rural population, that is, ),( 1NpQQ  .  It is also worth keeping in mind 
that, in our notation, an increase in the size of price scissors, that is, in an increase in the relative price of the urban 
good, corresponds to decrease p. 
 
The urban population is
2N , and an urban worker supplies 2L  hours of work which are fixed by the govern-
ment, based on technological consideration.  The urban consumption of the rural and the urban good is denoted 
by ),( 22 yx , and w is the wage per hour, in terms of the industrial good.  The budget constraint of an urban worker is 
given by  
 
(5) 
222 wLypx  . 
Denoting the urban individual‟s utility function by ),,( 2222 LyxUU  , the indirect utility is obtained form 
 
(6) ),,(max),( 222
,
2
22
LyxUwpV
yx
  ].[ 2222 ypxwL    
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The envelope theorem yields 
 
(7) ,0/ 222  LwV   
 
and .0/ 222  xpV   
 
Naturally, the urban consumption is a function of the relative price and the urban wage, that is, ).,(22 wpxx   The 
consumption goods are assumed to be normal.  The output of an urban worker is denoted by ),( 2LkYY  , where 
2/ NKk   is capital stock per urban worker, and K is the total urban capital stock. 
 
The economy under consideration is a closed economy. The sectoral populations are fixed.  The total popu-
lation is N, and  
 
(8) .21 NNN   
 
The two basic constraints in the economy are the quantity balances of the urban and rural goods, respectively.  
Defining I as the state‟s surplus of the urban good, we have  
 
(9) .;11222 KIyNyNYNI   
 
That is, the urban output is used either for consumption or for investment.  Similarly, the balance between the supply 
and demand of the rural good requires 
 
(10) ).,(),( 2211 wpxNNpQN   
 
PREOBRAZHENSKY’S FIRST PROPOSITION 
 
Preobrazhensky‟s most important claim was that the state can increase accumulation by moving the terms of 
trade against presents, that is, by increasing the size of scissors.  For ease of reference, we call this Preobrazhensky‟s 
first proposition.  Naturally, this proposition is quite basic, because it asserts the feasibility of using the terms of trade 
as an instrument for society‟s accumulation. 
 
Recall that moving the terms of trade against peasants means a decrease in;.  The above proposition thus 
says: dI / dp < 0. To examine the conditions under which this proposition holds, we obtain an alternative expression 
for the state‟s surplus.  Substitution of (2), (5), and (10) in (9) yields 
 
(11) ).( 22 wLYNI   
 
The state‟s surplus is therefore the difference between the urban output and the wage payment to the urban workers, 
and the surplus does not directly depend on the terms of trade, p. 
 
A change in p, however, requires a change in the urban wage w if the demand and supply balance of the rural 
good, (10), is to be preserved.  To obtain the relation between p and w, we first defined some notation.  Let m = 
wL
2
be the income of an urban worker, 
 
(12) 1Qp 1n Q /  1n p, 
 2xp 1n /
2x 1n p 
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and 2xm 1n /x 1n m 
 
be, respectively, the price elasticity of the rural surplus, the price elasticity of the urban consumption of the rural good, 
and the income elasticity of the urban consumption of the rural good.  Also, define wp as the percent change in the 
urban wage which must accompany a percent increase in p.  That is,  
 
(13) wp 1n w /  1n p. 
 
Next, differentiation of (10), and the use of the above definitions yields 
 
(14) ./)( 221 xmxpQpwp    
 
The change in the state‟s surplus due to a change in the terms of trade is then obtained from (11) and (14) as  
 
(15) dI / dp = ./)( 22122 xmxpqp pwLN    
 
In the above expression, the sign of the rural surplus response, ,1Qp  is not predictable theoretically because 
this response is a composite of the production response, the consumption response, and the labor supply response.    
Based on this evidence, we maintain throughout the paper that 
 
(16) .01 Qp  
 
Now, looking at the right side of (15), 
22
xmxpand are positive because consumption goods are normal.  
Using (16), therefore dI / dp <0.  (In fact, the same result will hold even if 
1
Qp  is negative within some range.)   
 
This proposition can be expressed in our notation as: dV .02 dp   From the earlier analysis, it is clear that 
there are two effects of changing the terms of trade on an urban worker: a direct price effect, and an indirect effect due 
to the induced change in the urban wage.  The total effect is expressed as  
 
(17) .
222
dp
dw
w
V
p
V
dp
dV





  
 
Substitution of (7) in the above yields 
 
(18) .
2
22
2






 wp
p
wL
x
dp
dV
  
 
We define 
222 wLpx as the urban budget share of the rural good, and 
2222 )/)(/( vpxxpuxp  as the price elasticity of the compensated demand for the rural good in the urban 
sector.  Using this definition, the Slutsky expression can be as 
 
(19) .
2222
xmx
u
xpxp    
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Substitution of (14), and (19), in (18) gives 
 
(20) 
 
.
2
21
2
222
xm
u
xpQp
x
x
dp
dV



 
  
 
In the above expression, 02 uxp form the standard Slutsky property of compensated demand.  It follows 
from (16) and (20) that d 0/2 dpV   Also note that a higher 1Qp corresponds to a higher d ./
2 dpV  
 
The aim of a policy reform analysis is to identify rules for an improvement in society‟s overall welfare.  
Naturally any such rule is more useful if less information is required to apply it.  The results in this section are 
particularly significant from this paint of view because, as we shall see, their application requires quite minimal 
information.   
 
The first step in the analysis of reform is to define the aggregate social welfare.  For this, we use an additive 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, , to aggregate over individual utilities. 
 
(21) ),()( 2211 VWNVWN   
 
where W is concave and increasing in V.  If  is the social value of the marginal investment, then the current value of 
the aggregate social welfare, H, is given by 
 
(22) .IH    
 
Substituting (11) in (22) 
 
(23) 
].[)),((
)),((
2222
111
wLYNwpVWN
NpVWNH



 
 
The above expression is now perturbed with respect to p, while ensuring a corresponding perturbation in the 
urban wage to preserve the identity (10).  Using (4) and (7), we obtain 
 
(24) 
dp
dw
w
H
dp
H
dp
dH




   
 
 = 





 wp
p
wL
xNQN 
2
22211
 ,/
22 pwLN wp  
where 
iii VW  /  is the social value of a marginal increase in the income of a worker in sector i.  The three 
terms on the right-hand side of (24) represent, respectively, the welfare gain to the rural sector, the welfare gain to the 
urban sector, and the loss of investment due to an increase in the relative price of the rural good.  Naturally, these 
gains and losses are weighted by their respective social weights. 
 
Using (10), and the definition of the budget share, 
2
x (24) can be expressed as 
 
(25)  .1/)(()(/ 22122  xwpxNdpdH   
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The expression (25) can now be used to trade, that is, the sufficient conditions which will guarantee that a 
specific change in the relative price will increase the social welfare.  Rewriting (25), we obtain 
 
(26)  1/)(()(/ 22122  xwpxNdpdH   
 
Next note from (19) that ,1/ 222 xmxxp  because .0
2 uxp   Further, as ,0
1 Qp it follows from (14) that  
 
(27) 1/ 2 xwp   
 
Substitution of the above in (26) yields the following two rules for reforms: 
 
(28)   21,0/ andifdpdH  
 (with at least one strict inequality). 
 
(29)   2,0/ ifdpdH and  2  
 (with at least one strict inequality). 
 
From (28) and (29), we find that: moving the terms of trade against (in favor of) peasants is described if the 
social weight on investment is greater (smaller) than the social weights on rural and urban income.  Note that this rule 
holds no matter which one of the two social weights on income is larger.  The reason for this is quite simple.  If the 
social valuation of a dollar of investment exceed the losses due to decreased consumption, regardless of which one of 
the tow sets of workers is worse off. 
 
A final paint needs to be emphasized here.  The above analysis clearly shows that, over a range of social 
weights, the decision to widen or to narrow the price scissors is independent of the comparison between rural and 
urban welfare.  Instead, this decision depends on the intertemporal comparison between consumption and investment. 
 
We are already in a position to recognize some features of the optimal price structure.  Assuming that a 
unique interior maximum exists for our maximization problem, we should have 0/ dpdH at the optimum.  The 
necessary conditions for this characteristic of the optimum can be extracted from (28) and (29).  We find that the 
optimal price structure must satisfy.
14
 
 
(30)  
1221 ,   or . 
 
In other words, if the social weight on investment does not lie between the social weights on the rural and the 
urban income, then the regime is not optimal, and it can be improved through price policy.  This result needs to be 
contrasted with a view often held in the literature on project evaluation that the social weight on investment should be 
higher than the (undifferentiated) social weight on consumption (Yotopoulos and Jeffery Nugent, 1976, p. 385, for 
example).  The view is incorrect if the terms of trade can be uses as an instrument of policy. 
 
To obtain the optimal tax formula, the following Lagrangian is defined by explicitly incorporating the rural 
good constraint, (10), into the maximand 
 
(31) (Available from the authors.) 
 
where   is given by (21), and p and w are the control variables. 15   The first-order conditions with respect to p and w, 
after some manipulation
16
, can be written as 
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(32)    ,/ 2121 xpQps    
 
(33)   222 / xmxs    
 
Equations (32) and (33) are alternative expressions for the optimal subsidy rate, and these can be easily 
interpreted.  Note from (32) that s is positive or negative depending on whether 
1  is greater than or smaller 
than
2 .  A higher  , on the other hand, corresponds to a lower level of utility. The expression (32), therefore, 
clearly demarcates the location of the optimal tax (or subsidy) between the two sectors: workers who are better off 
should be taxed, while the workers who are worse off should be subsidized.  This result is independent of the 
behavioral responses in the economy, of the social valuation of investment, and of whether the peasants or the 
industrial workers are better off.  Note, however, that the magnitude of subsidy does depend on the social weight on 
investment. 
 
(34)     wpwLpx  22212  . 
 
The above expression equates the net social gain from a price increase to the net social loss due to the price-induced 
wage increase.  Rearranging the terms in (34), we obtain a remarkably simple rule to characterize the optimum. 
 
(35) 
 
 



2
21
2
x
wp



 budget share. 
 
In the above analysis we have employed the terms of trade as the instrument of control.  This we have done 
to keep the analysis within the context of the scissors problem.  There are several alternative ways, however, in which 
the present problem can be characterized. 
 
First, consider the control of the nominal price of the urban good or the nominal urban wage, because it is 
through these variables that a terms-of-trade policy can actually be implemented.  It can be verified that an increase in 
the nominal price of the urban good corresponds to a movement in the terms of trade against the rural sector, and that 
an increase in the nominal urban wage corresponds to a movement in the terms of trade in favor of the rural sector.  
Either one of these two nominal variables can therefore be used as the instrument of control, without affecting the 
results. 
 
Second, the economic content of the analysis remains unchanged if either the level of investment, I, or the 
rural surplus, Q, is used as the independent policy instrument.  In these cases the analysis will correspond to what is 
sometimes called the “investment problem,” and the “marketed surplus” problem. 
 
Third, our conclusions regarding the terms of trade remain essentially unaltered if the “modern” capital good 
produced in the urban sector can be productively employed in the rural sector, and if the government exercises the 
choice over the intersectoral location of investment.  As a simple example, consider the case in which there is positive 
investment in both sector and the rent on the rural capital accrues to the rural sector.  Then it can be verified that 
pricing rules (32)-(35) continue to characterize the optimum.  Similarly our qualitative results on the terms of trade 
will not change if a time-dependent process of technical progress in production I incorporated in the model. 
 
Finally, we can reinterpret our analysis in a decentralized economic setting.  To see this first imagine that the 
government instructs its public sector managers to maximize profits based on the nominal prices they face, but 
introduces either a commodity tax on the urban good or a wage tax.  Naturally, then, the government can control the 
terms of trade at any level that it desires.  In particular, the optimum which we analyzed earlier is implementable in 
this manner.  Next, assume that the industrial production is privately owned, but that the government imposes a 100 
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percent profit tax, and that it also imposes one of the two taxes mentioned above.  It follows that the desired public 
policy can be implemented through a private market equilibrium. 
 
 
Table 1:  Empirical Analysis Of Oil Boom And Tax Yield 1970-1990 
 
Equation Constant Elasticity 
co-efficient 
Elasticity 
co-efficient 
lagged 
values 
Slope Shift F– 
statistics 
R² DW SER 
1 -1.104 0.643 0.265 0.00000006 0.730 457.05 0.984 1.817 0.225 
 (1.516) (3.992) 1.0607 (0.631) (2.940)     
2 0.8649 0.223 0.565 0.0000061 0.173 302.29 0.977 1.753 0.204 
 (0.967) (1.522) (3.062) (3.362) (1.040)     
3 0.254 0.297 0.466 0.0000018 0.209 162.27 0.957 1.987 0.258 
 (0.326) (2.166) (2.793) (1.674) (1.260)     
4 -0.163 0.738 0.111 0.0000092 -0.145 501.18 0.986 1.437 0.149 
 (0.355) (7.008) (1.097) (1.462) (0.989)     
5 -0.777 (1.407) 0.846 0.0000019 -0.216 243.06 0.971 1.99 0.245 
 (0.806) 0.192 (8.588) (0.178) (1.111)     
6 -0.787 (1.364) 0.841 0.0000062 -0.188 240.44 0.971 1.947 0.246 
 (0.838) -0.076 (8.313) (0.301) (1.031)     
7 1.172 (0.144) 1.092 0.0000015 -0.905 203.37 0.965 1.423 0.777 
 (0.268) 0.684 (6.099) (0.373) (1.176)     
8 -2.473 (3.578) 0.719 40.000013 -1.084 310.16 0.977 1.256 0.632 
 (2.861) 0.245 (5.836) (2.054) (1.739)     
9 -1.084 (1.441) 0.736 0.0000052 0.219 420.22 0.983 2.159 0.241 
 (0.991) 0.205 (5.384) (0.534) (1.027)     
10 -0.817 0.205 0.761 0.0000152 0.246 395.29 0.982 2.136 0.248 
 (0.701) (1.132) (5.169) (0.748) 1.100)     
 
 
Table 2 reports interesting results regarding the effects of SAP on the Productivity of the revenue sources.  
Forexample the elasticity index for GTR was very significant for both current and lagged values of GPA.  Further 
analysis shows that this finding was attributable to two main revenue sources, IMD and PPT, in which both the current 
and lagged values of GDP were significant.   Similar findings were reported for PPT and TOS. This is a rather 
puzzling findings, which may be attributable to massive leakages and the magnitude of revenue involved. However, 
the determination of the actual causes of this finding awaits further research.  
 
This suggestion is reinforced by the finding for IMD in relation to IMP where only the current value of GDP 
was found significant which is consistent with expectation given that import duties are assessed and payable 
immediately before the release of imported items. It also reflects a mopping-up of most of the laxity of the oil boom 
era in collection and timely remittance of import duty proceeds. 
 
Contrary to expectation, SAP did not affect the behavior of the revenue sources.  The only exception was 
NOR where both the intercept and the slope were positively and significantly affected.  The findings suggest a 
renewed focus on enhanced efficiency in the administration of non-oil revenue sources during the SAP period.  This 
was desirable reversal of the trend of the oil boom era when there was near total neglect of these other revenue 
sources. The investigation is explored within a vector autoregressive system. The results reveal that the energy sector 
exerts a significant influence on the Nigerian economy by acting as a prime mover. More importantly, Nigeria seems 
to find itself in a vicious circle, because of its inability to exercise control over the price of its main export and its 
imports. Thus, the strength and autonomy exhibited by Nigerians macroeconomic managers during the oil boom era 
appears to have been barren. 
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Table 2:  Structural Adjustment And Tax Yield In Nigeria (1970 – 1990) 
 
Equation Constant Elasticity 
co-efficient 
Elasticity 
co-efficient 
lagged 
values 
Slope Shift F– 
statistics 
R² DW SER 
1 -1.767   0.509  0.2594 0.00000034 -0.139 342.16 0.979 1.984 0.259 
 (2.243) (2.749) (4.101) (0.284) (0.554)     
2 -0.365 0.219 0/759 0.0000071 -0.553 315.31 0.977 2.063 0.199 
 (0.847) (1.513) (4.779) (3.144) (1.993)     
3 -0.533 0.342 0.556 0.00000048 0.137 154.88 0.955 2.142 0.264 
 (1.127) (2.555) (3.393) (0.408) (0.536)     
4 0.074 0.706 0.103 0.0000051 0.184 569.54 0.987 1.752 0.240 
 (0.434) (9.322) (1.079) (0.888) (1.317)     
5 0.302 0.121 0.858 0.000001 -0.252 238.39 0.970 1.816 0.246 
 (0.513) (1.44) (8.439) (1.070) (1.033)     
6 -0.429 0.141 0.850 0.0000037 -0.457 243.44 0.970 1.818 0.244 
 (0.661) (1.226) (8.305) (1.3015) (1.315)     
7 1.736 -0.148 1.010 0.00000092 0.039 193.24 0.963 1.221 0.796 
 (0.4210 (0.294) (6.734) 0.245) (0.051)     
8 -0.487 0.68 0.59 -0.005 -0.98 218.9 0.97 0.87 0.67 
 (2.66) (3.27) (5.06) (0.38) (0.82)     
9 -1.238 0.239 0.812 0.0000007 -0.162 409.98 0.983 2.25 0.244 
 (1.150) (1.382) (6.162) (0.623) (0.678)     
10 -0.998 0.165 0.876 0.000003 -0.336 390.75 0.982 2.287 0.249 
 (0.706) (0.923) (6.982) (1.064) (0.961)     
 
 
The per capita revenue in U.S. dollars follows nearly the exact same trend as the GDP over the course of the 
same years.  The amount of revenue that the each Nigerian makes as compared to the GDP is and should be very 
similar.  They rise and fall in the sample places and for the same reasons.  
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The Nigerian barrels per day index over the course of the same time period also fluctuates, but not to the 
same degree and ways that the GDP fluctuates.  In 1970 the oil began to be drilled for very openly and heavily.  Over 
the course of the next 10 years the barrels per day rose sharply or stayed fairly constant, fluctuating naturally.  During 
the recession and oil bust of the 1980‟s the barrels per day fell but were recovering by late 1987 and have continued to 
rise at a very steady rate since that point, peaking in 1991. 
 
The rise came after the 1980‟s bust because oil multinationals and JV‟s became much more involved in 
Nigeria.  The comparison of the barrels of oil per day to the trends of the GDP and the per capita are different though.  
The comparison between the thousands of barrels per day vs. the per capita on this next graph, show very different 
trends that promote reasons for investigation: 
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As the per capita trend follows that of the GDP exactly, it seems reasonable to believe that, with oil being 
backbone of the Nigerian economy, as the GDP went down, it would be largely if not entirely due to the fact that the 
oil revenues were failing and that barrels per day were declining.  But comparing the two, one can see that this is not 
the case.  The rates of both per capita and bbl / day both begin rising quickly and steadily in 1970.  But the rate at 
which the oil is going up is much faster than the rate which per capita is rising.  It seems legitimate to believe that as 
oil mining is increasing that the GDP would be increasing at a similar rate.   
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The peak of the bbl / day is constant for a longer period of time also.  While the per capita peaks and then 
almost immediately declines very sharply due to the 80‟s recession, the barrels per day peaks earlier and begins to 
decline after the per capita begins to decline.  The difference in these trends could be influenced by many reasons, but 
there are two main reasons.  The first is that oil prices were going down as barrels per day remained constant.  But an 
observation of oil prices shows that they were steadily increasing well into 1981.    
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The second reason is that the money was going elsewhere.  Whether it was going with the multinationals or 
into the pockets of corrupt politicians, the revenue from the oil was not going to the people of Nigeria.  This has long 
been a problem with the Nigerians:  revenue sharing from the profits of oil.  Looking at these trends it seems valid that 
the per capita is not well represented by oil prices and bbl/day.  Continuing the comparison of the trends bbl/day, per 
capita and oil prices all fell sharply remained low during the 1980‟s oil bust throughout the world.  But in 1990 while 
per capita stayed at a constant low, bbl / day began a sharp increase.   
 
Oil prices may be better suited to explain this trend difference because the oil prices remained in a trough 
caused by recession of the 80,s. But it would still make sense that as oil prices remained constant, low or not, and 
barrels/ day increased, that the per capita would have to increase. It seems hard to argue around the idea that oil 
revenue was not going towards per capita. And as oil prices did in 1998 along with the barrels, per day, per capita fell 
sharply. The money from the oil revenue, while oil prices and production rose, was not finding its way into the 
economy, or into the pockets of the citizens. Thought the comparisons of these trends, a more accurate idea of how oil 
production and revenue affect what the people of Nigeria get out of it is achieved. And it is because the Nigerian 
economy does not see this money from their natural resources that they produce, the other areas of their lives are 
affected.  Education suffers because money is not being put into schools. Infrastructure suffers because money is not 
being put into clean up the oil spills and the mess by mining to protect agriculture output and deforestation. 
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Literacy rates from 1989 to 2001 have been fluctuating and generally increasing but not the rate at which 
they should be. In1994 when the GDP began to rise, the literacy rate actually  fall , hitting rates below those during the 
recession in 1998.  Form 1999 to 2000 they met the 4.89% general quota but barely. The money from the GDP is not 
going into education as it should be.  The barrels per day increase and the GDP reflects that to an ex tent but even as 
both of those increases the literacy rate does not.  The money that should be  put into education is being put else 
where, and it is not infrastructure. 
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As infrastructure is developed, communications increase steadily. In a government producing 2,000,000 
barrels of oil per day, the projected phone per 100 people is 7.32. Nigeria should have nearly 8 phones per person and 
has only nearly 1 says that money is not being put into it. As oil prices, GDP and bbl/d rise the infrastructure should 
too. Telephones are a good indicator of how infrastructure is doing and in Nigeria it is not doing well. Energy output 
in Nigeria is directly harmed by the oil business. Oil spills mess created by drilling create environment problems that 
failed to be addressed by the government.  
 
Several Nigerian groups have campaigned actively, but with little success, to compel the government and 
major oil companies to introduce environmental safeguard. In 1988 the government created the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency FEPA has had only a minor impact. In1995 the weak and fragmented environmental movement 
was dealt a sharp blow when the government executed  Ken Saro-Wiwa , a well-know writer who struggled to stop 
environmental  degradation in the Niger River Delta. In many parts of the country, farmers have practiced 
environmental protestation for centuries.  
 
Their techniques include planting several different crops in a single field at once to cover the ground more 
evenly and thereby reduce erosion and increase applying manure to farmland to maintain soil fertility; and, in certain 
areas such as the Jos Plateau, terracing steep slopes. And shell has been targeted as the oil multinational behind it. But 
despite efforts of the citizens, the lack of government funding to promote energy output has created drastic 
environmental problems for Nigeria.  Nigeria‟s economy is based around oil.  As poor as it may be, its economy exists 
because of oil. Whether it helps or hurts the country on any general ground is a value judgment but there is much 
information through comparison that proves the Nigerian government is definitely putting the money into the wrong 
places. To have an economy based so singularly on one thing, a natural resource that is prominent and prolific in the 
area around, it seems like Nigerian should be doing much better. The government must get organized and take control, 
pushing through opposition and corruption to end the inequitable apportioning of profits that is the only way that 
Nigeria‟ soil market can be harnessed to bring the country up instead of holding it down. 
____________________ 
The grant for this project was funded by Ministry of Oil & Gas with Research Agreement No. 20043-3ANNGP and 
APG Oil Inc. with Matthew Uwakonye and Gbolahan Osho for project entitled “Oil & Gas Production and Price 
Stability in Nigeria”. 
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